ABSTRACT
Introduction
An extensive literature explores the impact of dismissal costs-also frequently called …ring costs or employment protection-on the operation of labor markets. Beginning with the seminal work of Lazear (1990) , much research has focused on assessing how dismissal costs a¤ect employment levels. Theory suggests, however, that dismissal costs may have ambiguous e¤ects on employment levels. Dismissal costs act as a tax on …ring, which reduces dismissals but also reduces hiring.
The net e¤ect of these o¤setting factors is ambiguous, at least in the short run. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the empirical literature has found widely varying e¤ects of dismissal costs on employment levels.
By contrast, theory makes a clear prediction about the impact of dismissal costs on the e¢ ciency of hiring and …ring. Provided that dismissal protections are not undone by Coasean bargaining, dismissal protections raise …rms' adjustments costs. Consequently, …rms will …nd it optimal not to hire workers whose short-term marginal product exceeds their market wage and will choose to retain unproductive workers whose wage exceeds their productivity (cf. Blanchard and Portugal 2001) . These distortions in production choices unambiguously reduce worker ‡ows. They are also likely to cause …rms to substitute capital for labor and have the potential to reduce productivity by distorting production choices. This paper evaluates whether, and to what extent, the introduction of dismissal costs a¤ects …rms'production choices and, ultimately, their productivity. The source of variation in dismissal costs that we exploit is the adoption of wrongful discharge protections by U.S. state courts from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. These common-law protections against wrongful discharge generated a ‡ood of litigation in adopting states and increased the uncertainty and potential cost of discharging workers. As has been established in prior work using both household survey data and aggregate state-level employment data, adoption of wrongful discharge laws had measurable e¤ects on state employment levels, unemployment-to-employment ‡ows, and the outsourcing of jobs to temporary help employers (cf. Miles 2000; Schanzenbach 2003; Autor 2003; Autor et al. 2004 and Kugler and Saint Paul 2004 ). Yet, these aggregate e¤ects have rarely been explored using representative 1 microdata on …rms, nor have their consequences for productivity been assessed. 1 In this paper, we simultaneously analyze the consequences of employment protections for establishment-level employment ‡ows and productivity. We …rst test whether dismissal costs reduce employment volatility-a necessary implication of any standard non-Coasean model-both at the extensive (entry/exit) margin and intensive (within-plant) margin. We next assess whether any reduction in employment volatility is accompanied by a reduction in productivity.
Our analysis exploits detailed, comprehensive establishment-level data from two Census Bureau surveys: the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). Sourced from U.S. tax records and Census surveys, the LBD provides annual employment and payroll information on all U.S. private establishments in most lines of business. The LBD is thus an exceptional resource for identifying the e¤ects of dismissal costs on how …rms adjust their labor inputs; its employment and wage records cannot, however, facilitate a further study of the concomitant adjustments of other factors of production and the consequences for productivity. We thus complement the LBD with a balanced panel of 'ongoing'manufacturing plants continuously surveyed by the ASM. We …rst demonstrate that the impact of dismissal costs on employment adjustment within this panel mirrors the LBD manufacturing universe, and then turn to the ASM's detailed operating data (e.g., output, capital investment, employment) to study extensively the important productivity outcomes.
We …nd that one of the three dismissal protections adopted during this period, the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing ('good faith'hereafter), reduced annual employment ‡uctuations and the entry of new establishments in adopting states. Consistent with the apparent rise in adjustment costs, we document that …rms in adopting states engaged in capital deepening, leading to a concurrent rise in labor productivity. Notably, we …nd evidence of a decline in total factor productivity following adoption of the good faith exception. Our e¤ects are strongest in the short-run, peaking around three years after the adoption and declining afterwards. These results suggest that adop-1 In contemporaneous work, Bird and Knopf (2005) analyze the e¤ects of wrongful-discharge protections on the earnings, pro…tability and e¢ ciency of the U.S. banking sector from 1980 to 1990. They conclude that adoption of wrongful-discharge protections raised wages, reduced pro…ts and lowered productivity in this sector. Petrin and Sivadasan (2006) introduce and implement a novel framework for estimating the e¤ects of employment protection legislation on productivity, focusing on its impact on the gap between workers' marginal revenue product and the wage. Using data from Chile, they …nd that increases in …ring costs raise this gap. Prieger (2005) examines the impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on the entry and exit of …rms in retail.
2 tion of dismissal protections altered short-run production choices and caused employers to retain unproductive workers, leading to a reduction in technical e¢ ciency. Clouding the interpretation of these results, however, is the …nding that adoption of the good faith exception is associated with implausibly large subsequent growth in manufacturing employment. This pattern suggests that our results may be partly contaminated by confounding economic shocks. Thus, while our analysis provides novel direct evidence that employment protections may reduce …rm-level productivity, the results must be viewed as tentative. It is our hope that future studies will provide further exploration of these initial results.
Wrongful Discharge Protections in the United States
The U.S. has long had a legal presumption that workers and employers may freely terminate their employment relationships 'at will,' that is without noti…cation, …nancial penalty or requirement to demonstrate good (or any) cause. This legal doctrine, referred to as employment-at-will, was …rst articulated by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1884 and was subsequently adopted into the common law by almost all U.S. state courts by the mid 1930s (cf. Morriss 1994) . 2 Beginning in the 1970s, the legal consensus supporting employment-at-will eroded rapidly. In a series of precedent-setting cases between 1972 and 1992, the vast majority of U.S. state courts adopted one or more common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. These exceptions constrained the ability of employers operating in adopting states to terminate workers 'at will.' These common-law exceptions are typically classi…ed into three categories: 1) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ('good faith'exception); 2) the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy ('public policy' exception); and 3) the implied-in-fact contract not to terminate without good cause ('implied contract'exception). 3 We summarize these exceptions here and refer the reader to Autor et al. (2006) for an extended discussion.
Read broadly, the good faith exception prohibits employers from …ring workers for 'bad cause. ' The de…nition of 'bad cause,'however, varies greatly by state and over time. The California Court of Appeals'famous 1980 good faith ruling in Cleary v. American Airlines 4 -likely the most in ‡uential of all good faith cases-was initially understood to bar California employers from terminating any worker without good cause. However, the California Supreme Court's 1988 ruling in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp vastly reduced the scope of the Cleary decision and limited the …nancial remedies available to plainti¤s. 5 At present, all eleven state courts that recognize the good faith exception (including California) primarily limit awards to 'timing' cases in which the employer intentionally terminates a worker to deprive her of a promised bene…t (e.g., a sales commission or non-vested pension). Hence, 'bad cause'under the good faith exception is currently construed narrowly, though this was not always the case.
The public policy exception, recognized by 43 states as of 1999, provides workers with protections against discharges that would inhibit them from acting in accordance with public policy. In states recognizing the public policy exception, workers may, for example, litigate if they are …red for performing jury duty, …ling a worker's compensation claim, reporting an employer's wrongdoing, or refusing to commit perjury on behalf of the employer. Because courts typically limit public policy cases to clear violations of explicit legislative commands, rather than violations of a vaguer sense of public obligation, the public policy exception is not generally thought to impose substantial constraints on employer behavior.
The implied contract exception, also recognized by 43 states in 1999, comes into force when an employer implicitly promises not to terminate a worker without good cause. Such implicit promises may include, for example: personnel manuals stating that the employer's policy is to terminate employees only for just cause; expectations arising from a worker's longevity of service or history of promotions and salary increases; and usual company practices that preclude terminating workers without good cause. The expected economic impact of the implied contract exception 4 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980 October) . 5 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) . Whereas the Cleary decision permitted plainti¤s to recover tortious damages for violations of the good faith doctrine, Foley reduced these damages to contractual losses (cf. Jung and Harkness 1989) . is hard to gauge. On the one hand, employers can potentially 'contract around' this exception simply by rewording personnel manuals and adding explicit language to employment contracts to state that all employees remain 'at will.' 6 On the other hand, …rms without sophisticated human resources sta¤ may be unaware of the implied contract exception or lack the expertise to fully insulate themselves from its reach. Additionally, the implied contract exception can potentially reclassify an employer's entire workforce as not 'at will,'which may impose signi…cant costs.
To assess the e¤ects of these employment-at-will exceptions on productivity and employment outcomes, we adopt a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach that contrasts state-level change in outcomes in adopting states to contemporaneous changes in outcomes in non-adopting states. This treatment-control contrast identi…es the average causal e¤ect of the exceptions on the outcomes of interest under the assumption that these outcomes would have otherwise evolved similarly in adopting and non-adopting states. We take a number of steps to buttress the robustness of this statistical approach. All econometric models include industry or industry-by-year …xed e¤ects (in addition to state …xed e¤ects) to absorb industry-wide shocks that may be correlated across states.
In addition, most speci…cations include state-speci…c linear time trends to account for possible pre-existing trends that may predate the adoption of employment-at-will exceptions and could otherwise be confounded with adoption. Some speci…cations further include plant …xed e¤ects, where identi…cation comes from contrasts of within-plant changes in outcomes in adopting relative to non-adopting states. As a falsi…cation test, we also estimate dynamic models that contrast changes in outcomes in years prior to and following adoption of exceptions to provide a check on the possibility that adoption of employment-at-will exceptions are caused by changes in outcomes rather than vice-versa. Figure 1 plots the number of states recognizing each of the three exceptions during the time period of 1970 to 1999 (at monthly frequency). 7 Two main points are visible. First, the public policy and implied contract exceptions are far more widely recognized than the good faith exception. 6 And indeed, large employers took such steps. The Bureau of National A¤airs (1985) found that 63 percent of large employers surveyed in the early 1980s had recently "removed or changed wording in company publications to avoid any suggestion of an employment contract,"and 53 percent had "added wording to applications and handbooks specifying that employment may be terminated for any reason." Sutton and Dobbin (1996) report that the percentage of …rms using 'at will'clauses in employment contracts increased from 0 to 29 percent between 1955 and 1985. 7 The dips in the series re ‡ect court reversals of doctrines that were previously recognized.
5
Second, adoption of each exception appears to follow something of a contagion pattern, with a large number of adoptions occurring in rapid succession between 1976 and 1988, followed by nearstasis from 1988 forward. This pattern suggests that adoptions that cannot be viewed as fully independent, but that a widespread change in legal thinking in the 1970s and 1980s led many state courts to amend the longstanding doctrine of employment-at-will at around the same time.
This potentially presents a challenge for identi…cation in that businesses might react in advance to anticipated changes in the legal environment, thus blurring the pre-post contrast. However, the date at which a state adopts a given exception is an idiosyncratic function of the cases brought before state high courts and the disposition of the sitting judges. Many states never adopt exceptions and others reverse or amend these exceptions after adoption. Accordingly, precedent-setting cases that generate exceptions to employment-at-will typically will provide a discrete element of surprise.
This is particularly likely to be true for the good faith exception, which was adopted more slowly and less extensively than either the public policy or implied contract exceptions.
As emphasized by Autor et al. (2006) , it is likely that a substantial component of the economic cost of the employment-at-will exceptions emanates from the uncertainty they introduced into the employment relationship. When most exceptions were adopted in the late 1970s through late 1980s, the volume and cost of wrongful discharge litigation that would ultimately ensue was unknown to …rms and potential litigants. Adding to the uncertainty, personnel and professional law journals (i.e., the trade publications relied upon by personnel managers and corporate attorneys) published numerous articles that appeared to overstate the scope of the protections a¤orded to workers and the penalties that …rms would incur for violating them (cf. Edelman et al. 1992) . Because employers were potentially led to anticipate greater constraints and costs than ultimately materialized, Autor et al. (2006) argue that the short-term and medium-term e¤ects of these dismissal protections may have exceeded their 'steady-state'e¤ects, and they present evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Several prior studies have analyzed the e¤ects of employment-at-will exceptions on labor market outcomes. The …rst study in this vein, Dertouzos and Karoly (1992) , found using aggregate statelevel data that adoption of common-law dismissal protections reduced state employment levels by as much as seven percent. Subsequent analyses by Miles (2000) , Schanzenbach (2003) however. These more recent studies …nd either modest negative e¤ects (Autor et al., Schanzenbach) or no e¤ects of dismissal protections on employment levels (Miles). As noted above, however, theory makes ambiguous predictions about the impact of dismissal costs on employment levels.
A number of studies also provide evidence that states'adoption of dismissal protections raised hiring and …ring costs. Miles (2000) and Autor (2003) show that employers in adopting states substituted temporary help agency workers for direct-hire employees, presumably in an e¤ort to minimize litigation risks. 8 Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) …nd using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that these protections (especially the good faith exception) reduced the re-employment probability of unemployed relative to employed workers, suggesting that dismissal protections exacerbated adverse selection into non-employment. Both sets of …ndings are signi…cant for our work because they demonstrate that the adoption of dismissal protections raised …rms'adjustment costs-a necessary condition for them to have had productivity impacts.
Our study builds on this prior work in two major respects. First, use of establishment-level data provides direct evidence on the e¤ects of dismissal protections on …rms'employment adjustments at both the extensive (plant opening/closing) and intensive (job ‡ows) margins. Second, we directly evaluate the consequences of dismissal protections for establishment-level production choices and realized productivity.
Theoretical Considerations
In a standard competitive model of the labor market, employment protections are economically equivalent to mandated employment bene…ts. Bene…t mandates raise the cost of employing workers, leading to an inward shift in labor demand. If, however, workers value the mandated bene…t at its marginal cost of provision-that is, the mandate is e¢ cient-then the Coase theorem applies.
Labor supply shifts outward to o¤set the inward shift in labor demand, employment levels are unchanged and wages fall to cover exactly the cost of the bene…t (cf. Summers 1989; Lazear 1990 ).
There are no productivity or employment consequences. 9
8 The implied contract exception in particular confers a comparative advantage on temporary help agencies since these …rms are universally understood to o¤er only short-term employment. It is the implied contract exception that appears primarily responsible for the growth of temporary help agency employment (cf. Autor 2003).
9 Aghion and Hermalin (1990) and Levine (1991) present models in which dismissal protections are under-provided by the private market due to adverse selection. Bertola (2004) also presents a model in which dismissal costs are under-Mandatory dismissal protections can impose e¢ ciency costs in the competitive model, however.
If workers value dismissal protections at less than their marginal cost of provision-or, equivalently, if some share of the termination bene…t accrues to a third-party, such as an attorney-the bene…t mandate drives a wedge between the private and social cost of job separations, yielding a deadweight loss. Because dismissal costs are only paid when workers and …rms separate, the deadweight loss component of the dismissal cost functions as a tax on separations-an adjustment cost. Consider, for example, a case where a worker's marginal product falls below his wage and the wage cannot drop su¢ ciently to compensate the …rm (either due to a non-negativity constraint or due to downward wage rigidities). If the worker values the dismissal bene…t at its marginal cost, both the worker and the …rm will agree to terminate the job. If the payment of the dismissal bene…t incurs a deadweight loss, however, both the worker and the …rm will …nd it optimal to continue the employment relationship so long as the present value of the productivity shortfall is less than the deadweight loss. Consequently, ine¢ cient dismissal protections-that is, protections that workers value at less than cost-inhibit e¢ cient job separations (and, indirectly, reduce e¢ cient accessions as well).
In the competitive model, these ine¢ cient dismissal protections unambiguously reduce allocative e¢ ciency-that is, they are welfare reducing. Their implications for the technical e¢ ciency of production are less clear cut. If dismissal protections cause …rms to retain (some) unproductive workers, this will cause a decline in labor productivity, ceteris paribus. O¤setting this factor, …rms may screen new hires more stringently, leading to a favorable compositional shift in the productivity of the employed workforce. Moreover, because ine¢ cient dismissal protections provide …rms with an incentive to substitute from labor to other factors of production, capital deepening may also raise the marginal product of labor. Hence, the net impact on technical e¢ ciency (as opposed to allocative e¢ ciency) is ambiguous.
While many labor economists use this competitive model as a benchmark, much of the macroprovided due to risk-aversion. Agell (1999) discusses why eliminating dismissal protections may not be desirable when labor markets are subject to fairness considerations and market imperfections, while Wasmer (2006) and Macleod and Nakavachara (2006) focus on human capital investment. In all these cases, dismissal protection mandates can be e¢ ciency-enhancing since workers may value these protections above their cost of provision. In the Coasean model, this would imply that imposing the mandate would raise employment levels. See Saint-Paul (2002) and Brügemann (2006) for theories on the political economy of employment protection. economic literature views employment protection through the lens of the Diamond-MortensenPissarides equilibrium unemployment model (cf. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Kugler et al. 2003) . As in the competitive model, dismissal costs in the equilibrium unemployment model curtail e¢ cient separations by reducing the threshold productivity at which …rms are willing to dismiss workers, thus reducing productivity. In contrast to the competitive model, however, worker-…rm matches in the equilibrium unemployment setting generate quasi-rents, and the allocation of rents between …rms and workers is typically determined through Nash bargaining. Nash bargaining exacerbates the deadweight loss from ine¢ cient employment protections. 10 In the Nash bargain, dismissal costs reduce the …rms'outside options or 'threat points,'causing workers'wage demands to rise even as pro…ts fall. Facing lower pro…ts and higher wage demands, …rms curtail job creation and increase the threshold productivity at which they are willing to hire. The induced rise in reservation productivity potentially leads to an increase in …rm-level productivity since less productive matches are not realized. 11 Hence, the net productivity e¤ect is again ambiguous.
Although the competitive and equilibrium unemployment models di¤er in their details, both imply that dismissal protections dampen employment adjustments but have ambiguous e¤ects on …rms' productivity. On the other hand, both models indicate that if dismissal protections do not reduce job ‡ows (perhaps because they satisfy Coasean equivalence), these protections should not a¤ect productivity. These theoretical observations motivate our empirical approach.
We begin by assessing whether adoptions of exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine reduce job ‡ows. We next turn to an analysis of their consequences for …rm productivity. Because of the many possible avenues of adjustment noted above, our empirical work examines the impacts of dismissal protections on multiple plant-level production outcomes including capital investment, capital intensity, labor productivity and total factor productivity. 1 0 Nash bargaining ampli…es ine¢ ciencies because it is non-Coasean; the initial allocation of property rights a¤ects both the distribution of resources and the e¢ ciency of bargained outcomes (cf. Grout 1984) .
1 1 Although productivity impacts are ambiguous, welfare consequences are generally negative, as in the competitive case above. If the search equilibrium is not initially constrained e¢ cient, however, it is possible for policy interventions to improve aggregate e¢ ciency (cf. Pissarides 2000, chapter 8).
Data Description
Establishment-level data are essential for characterizing how …rms and their associated establishments respond to the passage of dismissal protections. This project draws such data from two con…dential surveys collected by the Census Bureau-the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). Each survey is described below, and Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
Longitudinal Business Database
The LBD is a unique source for studying employment dynamics across manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Sourced from IRS tax data and Census surveys, the LBD annually covers approximately 3.9 million establishments with positive employment, representing over 68 million employees, in most U.S. private industries. Panel A of Table 1 highlights that most of the LBD's surveyed employees are in the manufacturing, retail trade and services sectors. These percentages are fairly similar for states passing dismissal protections and those not doing so. 12 The microdata …rst facilitate the development of complete state-industry-year panels of employment by summing employment counts across individual establishments. Publicly available series normally do not provide employment counts by state-industry; even when they do so, the Census Bureau is required to suppress values that compromise the con…dentiality of individual establishments. Building from the microdata overcomes these limitations and a full employment panel is developed for the 1976 to 1999 sample frame.
From this state-industry-year panel, we can estimate absolute year-over-year employment changes.
The mean absolute employment change over the sample is approximately 11 percent. This absolute job turnover metric aggregates over employment adjustments on the intensive margin (i.e., the hiring and …ring of workers by continuing establishments) and the entry/exit margin. In the LBD, establishments are assigned unique and time-invariant identi…ers that further a¤ord longitudinal estimations of these two dimensions of adjustment. The entry and exit rates for establishments are approximately 13 percent and 11 percent, respectively. As many entering and exiting establishments are very small in size, only 7 percent and 6 percent of employees are working in entering or exiting establishments, respectively. 13 Finally, the survey's reporting structure a¤ords the linkage of establishments to their parent …rms. Approximately 22 percent of establishments and 55 percent of employees are part of multi-unit …rms.
Annual Survey of Manufacturers
While the LBD provides a comprehensive view of employment dynamics across manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, reported data are limited to total employment and payroll only. To evaluate the impact of reduced job turnover for capital and productivity outcomes, we turn to two detailed surveys of manufacturers undertaken by the Census Bureau. The Census of Manufacturers (CM) collects operating data on all U.S. manufacturing plants at …ve-year intervals (i.e., 1972, 1977, and so on). In between the CMs, the Census Bureau conducts the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM). The ASM is a probability sampled subset of the CM, with the panel redrawn two years after each CM. Plants with more than 250 employees in the previous CM are sampled with certainty.
We extract from the ASM a balanced panel of all plants continuously monitored from 1972 to 1999. This restriction focuses on intensive adjustments in large plants operating in stable business climates; by conditioning on survival, the extensive margin is suppressed. While the approximately 5700 plants represent less than 2 percent of all U.S. manufacturing establishments, they account for over a quarter of total manufacturing activity in terms of employments and shipments. Almost all of these plants are part of multi-unit …rms, although not all of the plants have sister establishments within this balanced panel.
Year-over-year employment changes are again studied. While the average annual employment change is again 11 percent, a larger fraction of these changes are negative, re ‡ecting the trend decline in manufacturing employment from 1976 to 1999. In addition, the more detailed employment data for manufacturers allow us to examine production and non-production workers separately; the mean non-production worker employment share is 26 percent.
The continuous monitoring of this ASM panel a¤ords the calculation of detailed capital stocks and productivity metrics. Capital stocks are calculated with the perpetual inventory method, as explained below. The mean plant-level capital stock for the 1976 to 1999 sample is $31m in 1999 dollars. Labor productivity is de…ned as de ‡ated total value of shipments divided by total plant employment. Finally, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual from a production function of value-added on four factors: production workers, non-production workers, machinery capital, and structures capital.
Consequences of Employment Protections
In this section we discuss the impact of wrongful discharge protections on …rm behavior. We begin by examining the …rst-order e¤ect of employment protections on employment ‡uctuations, both at the intensive (within-establishment) and extensive (entry/exit) margins. If wrongful discharge protections increase adjustment costs, this should lead to a reduction in hiring and dismissals, resulting in an overall dampening of employment ‡uctuations. We next test the impact of employment protections on employment levels, a margin along which prior research has obtained mixed results. Finally, we turn to the important question of whether the possibly restricted ability of businesses to adjust employment due to the introduction of employment protections has productivity consequences.
E¤ects on Employment Fluctuations
We estimate the e¤ects of the wrongful discharge exceptions (i.e., good faith, public policy and implied contract) described in Section (2) on employment ‡uctuations using both the LBD and ASM. We begin by estimating the following equation using the LBD:
where ABS sjt is the absolute year-to-year employment change of a two-digit SIC sector j, in state s, at time t,
s , j and t are vectors of state, industry and time e¤ects, respectively. 14 GF st 1 , P P st 1 and IC st 1 are indicators of whether the good faith, public policy and implied contract exceptions were in place in state s at time t 1. 15 Thus, the coe¢ cients GF , P P and IC capture the e¤ects of employment protections on annual net employment ‡ows. 16 Our core battery of speci…cations also includes two estimations of greater stringency. First, we consider models with state-speci…c time trends. These require that identi…cation come from the discontinuity surrounding the passage of the wrongful discharge exception. These speci…cations can provide reassurance that our coe¢ cients are not re ‡ecting smoothly trending omitted variables that are potentially correlated with the adoption of the exceptions. A bene…t of the state-industry panel is that we can also control for industry-speci…c trends using the non-parametric form of two-digit SIC industry and year interactions. These latter estimations allow us to control for employment shifts due to national trends in a state's industries, again providing con…dence in the identi…cation strategy.
Panels A and B of Table 2 When we estimate these models for manufacturing alone in Panel B, we …nd a negative, and in the majority of cases, signi…cant, e¤ect of the good faith exception on employment ‡uctuations.
This result is robust to the inclusion of state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends. It suggests a reduction in employment ‡uctuations of 5 to 12 percent after the introduction of the good faith exception (i.e., dividing the -0.006 to -0.016 coe¢ cients by the average annual employment change of 13% in Table 1 for states adopting the good faith exception). The results for the implied contract exception remains insigni…cant. Surprisingly, we …nd a positive and signi…cant impact of the public policy doctrine on employment ‡uctuations in the LBD data. This latter result, however, is not supported in the upcoming analysis of the more accurate, establishment-level ASM panel.
The initial LBD analysis suggests a signi…cant e¤ect of the good faith exception on employment ‡uctuations in manufacturing. To test whether this …nding is consistent with a causal relationship, we evaluate the relationship between the adoption of the good faith exception and employment ‡uctuations using a dynamic speci…cation:
ICt+q IC st+q + GF t 6 GF st 6 + P P t 6 P P st 6 + ICt 6 IC st 6 + " sjt ;
where GF st+q , P P st+q and IC st+q indicate whether adoption occurred at year t + q. These dynamic variables capture the transitory e¤ects of the reforms. GF st 6 , P P st 6 and IC st 6 estimate long-term outcomes by indicating adoptions that occurred at year t 6 or before. These coe¢ cients are relative to the period three years prior to the reform, and their pattern indicates whether the earlier pre-post results (1) are consistent with a causal interpretation. In particular, we would be concerned if there are large and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients on the lead indicators, regardless of whether they are positive or negative. The speci…cation also helps identify whether the largest impacts of the exceptions occur over the short-run or long-run. 17
Appendix Table 1 presents results from this dynamic speci…cation estimated for the manufacturing sector, as well as additional speci…cations including state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends. The basic speci…cation shows negative coe¢ cients for the good faith lags, but mostly insigni…cant and weakly positive coe¢ cients for the leads, thus supporting a causal interpretation of our results. That is, the introduction of the exception precedes employment changes and not vice versa. By contrast, the public policy and implied contract leads and lags have typically positive coe¢ cients. The pattern for the public policy doctrine is particularly noteworthy since it suggests that the unexpected positive estimate for the impact of this doctrine on employment ‡uctuations found in Table 2 is likely to be spurious. These patterns are robust to the inclusion of state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends. The results using the LBD suggest that the impact of the good faith doctrine peaks approximately three years following adoption and that the long-term e¤ect is insigni…cant (i.e., six or more years following adoption). This pattern is comparable to Autor et al. (2006), who report that the near-term e¤ects of adoption of wrongful discharge doctrines dissipate within approximately …ve years, perhaps because the initial market uncertainty about the potentially vast-but ultimately modest scope-of the protections o¤ered is resolved (cf. Edelman et al. 1992 ). 18 Table 2 's results from the LBD suggest that manufacturing was particularly a¤ected by the introduction of wrongful discharge exceptions, likely because manufacturing employment is highly seasonal and highly cyclical, making dismissal protections particularly costly. 19 We use plant-level data from the ASM to further examine the e¤ects of employment protections in manufacturing.
Panel A of Table 3 presents analogous results to those using the LBD in Table 2 . Because our ASM sample uses a balanced panel of ongoing plants, we can now add plant …xed e¤ects to the prior speci…cation, leading to the following estimating equation:
The dependent variable is the absolute year-to-year employment change in plant p from t 1 to t; p is a plant …xed e¤ect. As before, we include state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends. The estimated standard errors again allow for error correlations across plants within states and within states over time. 20 1 8 Only 13 states introduced good faith exceptions during the period studied. California introduced the …rst good faith exception in a highly visible court ruling. Though our basic and dynamic LBD results on employment changes are strongest for the full sample of states, the results are qualitatively similar but less precise when California is excluded.
1 9 The mean year-to-year turnover in manufacturing was 12%, compared to 10% in construction, 6% in wholesale trade, 7% in retail trade, and 8% in services. Only mining had a higher annual turnover (27%). Regressions examining the mining sector also …nd a substantial dampening of annual employment volatility following the adoption of the good faith exception.
2 0 We have also estimated analogous models using an unbalanced panel of ASM plants (i.e., not limited to those Consistent with the LBD, the results using the ASM suggest that the good faith exception reduces employment ‡uctuations. We do not …nd evidence, however, in the ASM sample that the implied contract or public policy doctrines impact employment ‡uctuations. We estimate in Table   3A that the good faith exception reduces employment ‡uctuations by 1.5 to 4.5 percent, which is about half the size of the estimate using the LBD data. While this …nding is only marginally statistically signi…cant, supporting evidence from dynamic speci…cations below suggest that the e¤ect is likely to be causal.
The di¤erence between the LBD and ASM results are explained in part by the fact that in the ASM we can control for additional unobservable factors a¤ecting a plant's employment ‡uctuations.
Contrasting Columns (4) and (6), with and without plant …xed e¤ects, we can see that excluding plant e¤ects using our ASM sample implies a reduction of 5 percent in employment ‡uctuations as opposed to 2 percent with plant e¤ects. As is shown in the next sections, the remaining di¤erences between the estimates in the LBD and the ASM samples are likely due to the fact that the LBD includes entering and exiting business while the ASM sample is composed of a balanced sample of ongoing plants. The ASM analysis therefore excludes any e¤ect of wrongful discharge protections on employment ‡uctuations occurring through entry and exit.
As with the LBD, we also estimate a dynamic speci…cation using ASM data. Table 3B presents these estimates. Similar to the patterns found with the LBD, leads of the good faith exception are found to have weakly positive and insigni…cant e¤ects on employment ‡uctuations while lags of the good faith exception have negative e¤ects on employment changes. The maximum dampening is again attained three years following adoption. As with the LBD estimates, the long-term impacts are insigni…cant and, in the case of the ASM, weakly positive. 21 Since employment protections may also a¤ect seasonal employment ‡uctuations (cf. Wolfers 2005), we also study a quarterly employment churn measure to complement the year-over-year changes. In particular, we estimate equation (3) using as a dependent variable the following measure continually operating). Findings from these models, which are qualitatively similar, are available from the authors on request. 2 1 As for the LBD results, the ASM …ndings are qualitatively similar but somewhat less precise when we exclude California from our sample. As a complement to the panel estimations, similar results are found with lagged dependent variable speci…cations that test for mean reversion.
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of quarterly churn for production workers: 22
where P W max pt and P W min pt are the maximum and the minimum quarterly production-worker employment in plant p in year t, respectively. As before we allow for state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends and cluster the standard errors on state.
Panel B of Table 3A shows results for these speci…cations. Estimates without state trends show negative e¤ects of the good faith exception on seasonal adjustments of production workers, but the results are not signi…cant and the e¤ects become positive when controlling for state trends.
Looking deeper, however, the results from the underlying dynamic speci…cations reported in Table   3C consistently show weakly positive coe¢ cients on the leads and negative coe¢ cients on the lags. Moreover, the dampening is again most signi…cant three years after the adoption. Thus, the dynamic speci…cations appear most consistent with a signi…cant causal e¤ect of the good faith exception on seasonal employment ‡uctuations over the short-run to medium-run.
E¤ects on Entry and Exit
The di¤erence in the magnitudes of the estimated e¤ects of wrongful discharge exceptions on employment ‡uctuations in the LBD and the ASM samples suggests that part of the reduction in employment ‡uctuations observed following adoption of the good faith exception is explained by changes in …rm entry and exit (i.e., the extensive employment margin). To evaluate the importance of external adjustment, we use the LBD to estimate regressions similar to equation (1), where the dependent variable is the log of the average count of plants over …ve-year intervals among continuing, entering and exiting businesses. We use …ve-year averages to minimize the possibility of capturing spurious entry and exit due to 'ghosting'and reporting bumps observed surrounding Census years.
The wrongful discharge indicators take the value of one if the exceptions had been adopted as of the midpoint of the …ve-year intervals. 23 Panels A through D of Table 4 report results of these regressions for total, continuing, entering and exiting plants, respectively. Panel A shows little change in the total count of plants in response to the introduction of any of the exceptions. However, Panels B through D show that in the case of the good faith exception, this re ‡ects countervailing forces among continuing and other plants.
Panel B shows an increase in plant survival after the introduction of good faith exceptions, though this e¤ect is only marginally signi…cant. Panel C shows that entry is substantially reduced in manufacturing after the introduction of good faith exceptions, though exit is una¤ected. These results, controlling for state-speci…c and industry-speci…c trends, suggest a reduction of 7.7 log points in the number of entering plants, where log points refer to 100 times the coe¢ cient in the log-linear speci…cation (thus roughly corresponding to percentage point changes). 24 This translates into a reduction of about 9,000 establishments. By contrast, the public policy and implied contract exceptions do not appear to a¤ect entry.
In combination with the …ndings in Tables 2 and 3 
E¤ects on Employment Levels
Here we explore the e¤ects of wrongful discharge exceptions on employment levels. As discussed, the e¤ect of these dismissal protections on net employment is theoretically ambiguous (at least in the short run) since both dismissals and hiring are a¤ected.
We start by estimating similar regressions to equation (3) using the ASM data, but where the dependent variable is the log of employment in plant p at time t. Table 5 presents results of when additional manpower is devoted to updating the business registry. This updating has a noticeable e¤ect on establishment counts, but not on summed employment levels used for year-to-year employment changes. Entry and exit are de…ned as the …rst and last year an establishment is observed in the LBD, respectively, with the end years of the sample excluded. Establishments alive for a single year are recorded as both entering and exiting. This procedure ignores potential exit and re-entry by establishments, but more importantly avoids spurious entry and exit from 'ghosting'establishments with poor longitudinal linkages. When employment is disaggregated into production and non-production workers, we …nd that the increase in total employment following the introduction of the good faith exception is driven primarily by the increase in employment of non-production workers. For example, the …nal columns of Panels B and C suggest that production employment does not react to the introduction of the good faith exception while non-production employment in the typical plant increases by 4.8 log points following the introduction of this exception. 26 This di¤erential rise in non-production demand may be explained by capital-skill complementarity (cf. Griliches 1969; Berman et al. 1994 ), as Section (5:4) will show that the adoption of the good faith exception may have spurred capital-deepening in …rms.
As before we also estimate dynamic speci…cations to test whether our …ndings are consistent with a causal interpretation. In these speci…cations, found in Appendix Table 2 , the estimated impact of the good faith exception on employment levels commences a year prior to adoption and becomes puzzlingly large in subsequent years when state-speci…c trends are included, exceeding 10 log points in years six forward. This pattern is very unlikely to re ‡ect a causal relationship and suggests the presence of confounding shocks. A potential explanation is that California and Arizona, the two largest states that adopted a good faith exception, experienced unusually strong employment growth in the late 1980s, likely for reasons unrelated to this particular legal doctrine. 27 The results for the public policy exception have inconsistent signs across speci…cations and show no evidence of a trend break after adoption of the doctrine. By contrast, results for the implied 2 6 These results are robust to various speci…cations and to the exclusion of California and Arizona, even though Arizona had unusually high employment growth during the 1980s and 1990s.
2 7 In fact, excluding California from the estimates largely eliminates the estimated positive employment e¤ects of the good faith exception. However, California is arguably the strongest test-case for evaluating the labor market impact of this exception since the Cleary decision is the landmark case among good faith rulings. We are accordingly reluctant to remove California from the sample. Excluding Arizona reduces but does not eliminate the estimated positive employment e¤ect. contract exception show consistently negative e¤ects for both leads and lags, though the lead e¤ects are smaller. Table 6 shows results from regressions similar to equation ( (Table 5 , Panel A) and on employment levels in ongoing plants in the LBD (Table   6 , Panel B). This pattern is expected since the ASM sample is composed exclusively of ongoing plants. In summary, the net growth of employment that we observe after adoption of the good faith exception is accounted for by reduced job creation in entering plants and increased job destruction in exiting plans-both of which led to reduced employment-accompanied by more than o¤setting employment growth in ongoing plants.
As with the ASM, the dynamic speci…cations in Appendix Table 3 show positive coe¢ cients on the good faith exception's leads and implausibly large positive coe¢ cients on the lags, making questionable a causal interpretation of the e¤ects on employment. The results for the public policy and implied contract doctrines are comparable to the prior estimates. 29 2 8 Annual employment regressions yield quantitatively similar results, though the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are smaller. We use employment at …ve-year intervals here to keep consistency with the results on the counts of entering and exiting plants presented in the previous section.
2 9 Table 6 also shows economically large, although inconsistent, e¤ects of the public policy exception on employment levels. Similar to earlier studies, this pattern raises puzzles about the interpretation between the public policy exception and employment. 20
Productivity E¤ects
The …nding that the good faith exception reduces job ‡ows is consistent with the expectation that this discharge protection raises …rms'adjustments costs. Here we explore the consequences of this rise in adjustment costs on other margins of non-labor adjustment. One such margin is capital substitution; if discharge protections raise the e¤ective price of labor by making it more expensive to hire and …re, …rms may substitute towards other inputs. Second, given the restrictions on …rms' ability to adjust, we also may expect total factor productivity to be a¤ected-though as noted in Section (3), compositional shifts in worker hiring following the adoption of dismissal protections may generate countervailing e¤ects on labor productivity.
We begin by examining whether productivity was a¤ected by employment protections due to changes in input composition. In particular, we ask whether the introduction of employment protections a¤ected capital investment and, subsequently, capital-labor ratios. Panels A and B of Table 7 report results of speci…cations similar to equations (1) and (3) without and with statespeci…c and industry-speci…c trends, but where the dependent variables are the log of total capital investment and the log of the capital-labor ratio.
Capital stocks are measured at the beginning-of-year and constructed using the perpetual inventory method. Capital stocks are separately calculated for machinery and structures and then aggregated for total capital metrics. The capital stock of plant p in industry j at time t is:
where initial capital stocks in 1972 are obtained by de ‡ating book values of capital by BEA twodigit SIC de ‡ators for installed capital. New equipment investments, I N pt 1 , are de ‡ated with NBER four-digit SIC new-capital de ‡ators, P N Ijt 1 . Used equipment purchases, I U pt 1 , employ the NBER four-digit SIC de ‡ators lagged three periods. The annual depreciation rates, jt 1 , are obtained from the BEA by two-digit SIC industries.
Panel A of Table 7 shows a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of the introduction of the good faith exception on total investment (machinery and structures) of 6.5 log points (Column 6) but show no e¤ects from the introduction of the public policy and implied contract exceptions. Dynamic speci…cations in Appendix Table 4 indicate that capital investment peaks several years after adop-tion of the good faith exception and then declines somewhat thereafter (a pattern similar to the results for employment ‡uctuations). However, leads of the good faith adoption variable in the dynamic speci…cations are notably negative (though statistically insigni…cant), suggesting that part of the post-adoption rise in capital investment may re ‡ect an investment rebound from an earlier downturn.
Not surprisingly given the increase in employment levels, Panel B of Table 7 shows mixedalbeit generally positive-e¤ects of the good faith exception on capital-labor ratios. For example, estimated e¤ects are negative when controlling for state-speci…c trends but become positive when controlling for plant e¤ects. Dynamic speci…cations in Appendix Table 5 …nd negative coe¢ cients on both leads and lags, raising the question of whether the introduction of the good faith exception followed rather than preceded increases in the capital-labor ratio.
To explore e¤ects on productivity, Panel A of Table 8 presents results of speci…cations like equations (1) and (3), but where the dependent variables is a TFP measure estimated using a production function residual methodology. For the residuals methodology, we …rst estimate the following production function in logs for each two-digit SIC industry and year using ordinary least squares:
where Y pt is value added (i.e., total value of shipments net of materials/fuels costs and inventory adjustments) in plant p at time t de ‡ated using the NBER four-digit SIC shipments de ‡ators, L pt is the count of production or unskilled workers, and H pt is the count of non-production or skilled workers. K M pt and K S pt are the separated machinery and structures capital stocks, respectively. The residuals from the regression above provide our TFP measure:
The results in Table 8 show a uniformly negative and generally signi…cant e¤ect of the introduction of the good faith exception on TFP, though the e¤ect is slightly attenuated when we control for plant e¤ects. By contrast, the public policy exception appears to have a positive e¤ect and the implied contract exception appears to have a negative e¤ect, though neither is signi…cant in 22 any speci…cation. 30 However, results from dynamic speci…cations reported in Appendix Table 6 show mostly negative coe¢ cients for both leads and lags of the good faith exception, though the coe¢ cients on the lags are substantially larger. The dynamic speci…cation thus raises some question about a causal interpretation of the good faith e¤ects on productivity, though the available evidence is mostly consistent with a reduction in TFP in the four years following adoption of the good faith exception.
Finally, Panel B of Table 8 explores whether the increase in capital investment following the introduction of the good faith exception found in Table 7 a¤ected labor productivity. We estimate that labor productivity rose substantially (by 1 to 4 log points) following adoption of the good faith exception. This measured rise in labor productivity follows from the fact that both capital investment and non-production worker employment (Tables 5 and 7 ) rose after adoption of the good faith exception. Since our labor productivity measure does not adjust for the quality of labor inputs, the rise in raw labor productivity is likely to re ‡ect a mixture of capital deepening and compositional shifts in labor quality. Thus, this …nding is not at odds with the conclusion that the good faith exception reduced TFP. Results from dynamic speci…cations for labor productivity that control for plant e¤ects (Appendix Table 7 ) show negative coe¢ cients on the leads and positive though insigni…cant coe¢ cients on the lags, suggesting that the good faith exception preceded the increase in labor productivity.
Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions. The …rst is to exploit microdata to examine the e¤ect of dismissal protections on establishment-level outcomes in a representative sample of employers. The second is to consider simultaneously the e¤ects of these protections on job ‡ows-where there are unambiguous theoretical implications-and on several other important (and mostly unstud-ied) margins of …rm behavior, including capital investment, labor productivity and total factor productivity, where the predictions of theory are less clear cut. We believe that the power of the analysis derives from the evidence that the adoption of one particular dismissal protection, the good faith exception to employment-at-will, reduced employment ‡uctuations in adopting states.
These e¤ects were largest in the …rst three years following adoption and diminished thereafter. This …nding indicates that adjustment costs rose in the short-run, a necessary condition for there to be an impact on economic e¢ ciency.
The …nding on employment ‡uctuations motivates us to analyze how this short-run rise in adjustment costs impacted …rms'choices of capital and labor inputs, and ultimately, their productivity. The most surprising result of our analysis is that the increase in adjustment costs appears to have spurred capital and skill deepening-that is, …rms raised capital investment and increased non-production worker employment. These changes in input choices led to a rise in measured (nonquality-adjusted) labor productivity and a decline in total factor productivity. This last …nding is potentially quite important because, if correct, it provides con…rmation that exogenous increases in adjustment costs reduce e¢ ciency.
Our …ndings also present two unresolved puzzles. First, the adoption of the good faith exception appears to follow (likely by coincidence) a major investment downturn. This pattern reduces our con…dence in the causal interpretation of the rise in capital investment following adoption of the good faith exception. The second puzzle is that the estimated positive e¤ect of the good faith exception on employment levels is larger than appears plausible (albeit often imprecisely estimated). In light of these puzzles, we view our …ndings as suggestive but inconclusive. Though our data support the hypothesis that adoption of the good faith exception raises adjustment costs, the anomalous results for employment levels suggests a cautious interpretation of the …ndings until further evidence accumulates.
Our results have interesting parallels with those of a recent study by Acemoglu and Finkelstein While the Acemoglu-Finkelstein …ndings are drawn from a distinctly di¤erent economic context than our study (i.e., a heavily regulated sector versus a relatively competitive sector) and exploit a di¤erent source of policy variation (i.e., employment subsidies rather than dismissal costs), the parallels with our …ndings for the e¤ect of dismissal protections on the U.S. manufacturing sector are nonetheless intriguing and deserving of further consideration. 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 States Recognizing Employment-at-Will Exception Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered on state reported in parentheses. TFP is the establishment-level residual from a regression of value-added on four factors of production (production employment, non-production employment, machinery capital and structures capital) at the industry-year level. App. App. App. App. App. 
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